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the Bulgarian government to follow a policy of politic4l and diplomatic subservience to Russia, in order to permit the latter to strengthen her position at the Straits. Throughout the period of the sixties and seventies, the Russians and Bulgarians had co-operated effectively and had worked toward a common goal. After the liberation, however, when it became apparent to the Bulgarian government and people that Russia considered them a mere pawn to be used in international power diplomacy, they naturally reacted violently against this policy. A typical example of the consequences of this Bulgarian resentment is furnished by the constitutional problem of 1892-93 and the question of the marriage of Prince Ferdinand. This episode illustrates clearly how Bulgarian nationalism, pride, and spirit of independencequalities which the Russian government had made use of against the Turks-were now to plague the liberating nation.
The principal architect of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans in this period was Tsar Alexander III.2 A disciple of the ultra-reactionary K. P. Pobedonostsev, Alexander adhered to his teacher's principles of orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationalism. Reflecting these teachings, Alexander wrote in 1885 that, with respect to the Balkans, "the Slavs must now serve Russia and not we them."3 The strong reaction of the Bulgarian government against such an attitude, together with a series of arrogant and overbearing acts on the part of Russian officials in Bulgaria, finally, in November 1886, led to the actual rupture of diplomatic relations.4 Thereafter, the tsar, feeling personally insulted by the actions of a government which he regarded as his vassal, actually approved a plan devised by a group of Bulgarian emigrants to precipitate a revolt in Bulgaria. Their object was the overthrow of the interim anti-Russian government of Stefan Stambolov and the restoration of a proRussian administration. plomacy. As long as Russo-Bulgarian relations did not improve and while Turkey was maintaining a sincere and friendly policy toward her vassal, Bulgaria should not sever the bonds which tied her to the Ottoman Empire. If, Stambolov argued further, the prince had been recognized by the great powers and his suzerain, then, no doubt, a marriage could have been arranged without a change in the constitution. Since the question of recognition might drag on for years, the constitution had to be amended to permit the prince to marry and establish a dynasty.17
Not only were the Bulgarian representatives astounded at this proposal, but the two foreign supporters of the regime, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, who encouraged Bulgarian resistance to Russia whenever and wherever possible, found Stambolov's suggestion incomprehensible. The British considered the plan ill-timed and ill-advised; they feared that it might even provide an excuse for Russian interference in Bulgaria.'8 The Austrians were particularly disturbed because they believed that Russia would consider them the instigators of an "attentat against Orthodoxy" and of a plot to deliver Bulgaria to catholicism.'9 Both Austria and Britain questioned the wisdom of arousing the Bulgarian clergy, who were believed to be extremely sympathetic to the Russian point of view. that the Bulgarians would allow no interference from the Russian church, since they considered their church older than the Russian. He admitted that the Russian government might protest, but with what validity? It could hardly object to the religion of the children of a prince whom it had declined to recognize for six years. Notwithstanding these assurances, both powers considered the measure unfortunate.
Stambolov's proposal was debated in the assembly for two weeks. During this period the opponents of the amendment were given ample opportunity to express their views. The rapidly dwindling numbers of the opposition, however, were no match for the well-organized political machine which Stambolov commanded. Consequently, when the measure was finally submitted to the representatives, they voted 245 to 13 to revise Article 38 to read as follows:2' "The Prince of Bulgaria shall profess none but the Orthodox faith. Only the Prince who, by election, has ascended the Bulgarian throne, if already professing some other Christian faith, then he and his first successor may remain in that faith."
The final draft was a compromise, because only the first successor was allowed to profess the faith of his parents; those that followed would be Orthodox.
At the same time that the Bulgarian assembly was considering the change in the constitution, the Russian conservative press gave expression to its bitter disappointment with the Stambolov re- In the history of Russo-Bulgarian relations the strongest link between these two nations had always been religion. For many decades the Russian government had closely followed the Turkish persecution of the Balkan Christians and had at times rendered assistance. As a result, the Bulgarian clergy and people had come to recognize Russia as the leader of the Orthodox world. Many of the prominent Bulgarian ecclesiastical officials, who had received their training in Russia, were deeply devoted to her and appeared ready to follow her dictates in all matters. Thus the Russian government was led to believe that it could always rely on the Bulgarian Orthodox hierarchy to carry out its wishes among the Bulgarian people. a formula was devised for mentioning Ferdinand in the religious ceremony.0 Thus, although losif registered a protest against the constitutional change, it appears that he did so not as a sign of opposition to the Bulgarian government but because he was at first uninformed and uncertain of Stambolov's motives in proposing the constitutional change and was afraid that it indeed might be an "attentat against Orthodoxy." Once the exarch understood Stambolov's real purpose, he informed the Bulgarian government that he personally would no longer oppose the amendment, although he believed that the matter should be referred to the Bulgarian holy synod for consid- The exarch was ready to go even one step further to demonstrate his reconciliation with the Bulgarian government. Not being in the best of health, he desired to visit Austria for medical treatment. He wished to schedule his trip to coincide with Ferdinand's return from Italy in order that he could meet the prince. He would thus also be able to preside at the religious ceremony which was to be held in honor of the royal couple upon their entry into Sofia on June 10. Although this plan was never carried through, because of the refusal of the sultan to grant Josif a passport, it did establish the fact that the exarch now gave his support to Ferdinand's govemment.37
The The only triumph which Russia could claim at this time was that she had succeeded in preventing Ferdinand and his bride from returning to Bulgaria through Constantinople. The proud prince, wishing that his bride's first impression of his principality be most favorable, desired to sail through the Straits and disembark on the attractive Black Sea coast. If this scheme were carried out, diplomatic protocol would demand that the prince pay his respects to his country's suzerain, the sultan. When Russia learned of this plan, she considered that such an audience would mark another step toward Ferdinand's recognition. Therefore, the Russian ambassador was instructed to inform the Porte that if the visit should take place, the ambassador would immediately leave Constantinople. The other great powers, realizing that the plan would be considered a personal affront to Alexander and possibly could even antagonize him to the point where he would take some unforeseen action, advised the sultan to comply with the tsar's wish. that he would not be granted passage through the Straits.9
Thus, although the Russian government was able to prevent Ferdinand's trip, it failed in its major plan, which was to obtain the co-operation of the Bulgarian clergy, in particular the exarch, and the Bulgarian people in its campaign to thwart the constitutional change and thereby prevent the marriage. Russia had again misjudged the trend of public opinion in Bulgaria. The Russian government had been convinced that it could dictate to the Bulgarian electorate through the exarch, but the latter had proved that he was first and foremost the religious leader of the Bulgarians. He, too, now recognized the advantages of the security and stability which an established dynasty would offer his country. Since Stambolov had proved that by his pro-Turkish policy he could obtain religious concessions from Turkey without Russian support, the exarch saw no reason to abandon the Bulgarian government merely to satisfy Alexander III.
The favorable settlement of the constitutional problem marked the height of Stambolov's career. He had ignored the advice of Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and his closest advisers by challenging Russia in the religious sphere, where she was believed to have almost absolute authority. During his tenure in office, Stambolov gained dictatorial powers, and, in general, his opinions prevailed in all matters. Even a prominent Russian foreign office official believed that "der Prinz Ferdinand sei gar nichts, Stam- 41 Whereas Alexander looked at the Bulgarian situation with great foreboding, a segment of the Russian press, in particular, the journal Viestnik Evropy [The messenger of Europe], looked at the problem very realistically. Viestnik Evropy criticized the conservative journals and thus indirectly condemned the tsar also. It commented that the con-
